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Abstract
Abduction is regarded as the inference process that goes from observations to explanations within
a more general context or theoretical framework. There are good characterizations of abduction of
surprising observations in monotonic theories. Also, in normal logic programs there are a tight rela-
tion among SLDNF and the abduction of negative literals. However, a problem that faces abduction
is the explanation of anomalous observations, i.e., observations that are contradictory with respect to
the current theory. For this reason, in this work we will consider the problem of embedding abduction
of surprising and anomalous observations in defeasible (nonmonotonic) theories. We discuss some
issues arising the pragmatic acceptance of abductive inferences in defeasible theories, and how to
accommodate anomalous observations and characterize all the possible outcomes that a defeasible
theory may face when confronted with new evidence. We explore the use of partial structures ap-
proach as a semantic foundation for our system. Finally, we discuss an application of our system as
a formal device for representing the methodology of scientific research programmes. In this repre-
sentation, a programme is regarded as a defeasible theory that draws predictions. When confronted
with surprising or anomalous observations, the programme protects itself by means of heuristic pro-
cedures, which are represented in our system as abductive inference procedures.
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1. IntroductionLogic has been traditionally regarded as the study of consequence relations. This no-
tion makes no particular distinction between deductive and non-deductive inferences (for
instance, ampliative inferences). In fact, many structures of thought accepted by the tra-
dition in Logic mixed freely both forms of inference. But during a short period of time
(starting at the end of the XIXth century), Logic became reduced almost only to the study
of deductive inference. The pragmatic stance—that is, the use of logical systems—was al-
most overlooked. This may be reasonable in the realm of Mathematics, where reasoning
is entirely formal. In most contexts, however, reasoning is far from being as indefeasible
as in Mathematics. For this reason, non-deductive forms of reasoning (based on the use of
ampliative inference) are common in most fields of knowledge. In fact, every use of infer-
ence in those fields assumes the fallibility of its conclusions, and therefore a disposition to
change the principles or reasoning lines on which consequences were drawn. A remarkable
field where this is the case is in Scientific Reasoning (SR) (i.e., the branch of the Theory
of Science that copes with the discovery, justification and assimilation of knowledge by
means of a “scientific method”).
The need of non-deductive reasoning was recognized in AI research from its very be-
ginning. A large number of applications were built that performed more or less ad hoc
inference procedures that were indispensable to serve to a given pragmatical purpose (for
instance, in planning, natural language processing, “expert systems” and many other). In
the early 80s, a programme emerged within logical AI that is intended to give sound foun-
dations for these and other defeasible reasoning (DR) systems. The purpose of this research
is to formalize defeasance in reasoning in a way as close as possible to CL. In other words,
the aim of this defeasible reasoning programme is to generalize deductive inference with
the possibility of generating, weighing and eventually defeating many coexisting lines of
reasoning generated within a given context. Simple as this sounds, more than two decades
of research had shown that both a thorough formalization, and a satisfactory computational
implementation is plagued by difficulties.
Given the similarities among DR and SR, it seems sensible to try to adapt the work
on the former to the formalization of the later. There have been some interesting research
examples that mimic isolated cases of scientific discovery, and a fewer that also try to give
formal grounds for the procedures that lead to scientific discovery.2 Instead of considering
isolated cases or branches of Science and try to elicit an adequate and computationally
successful scientific method, in this paper we propose to adopt an epistemology (a rational
reconstruction of SR), and, after that, give a formal ground for a reasoning system that
adequately represents that epistemology. In particular, in this work we propose a model
for representing Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes [24] using as a
formal basis the abductive inference procedures within a defeasible reasoning system.
2 Herbert Simon’s work [26,46–48] for instance, regards SR as problem solving (close to Laudan’s ideas
[27]). In Valdes-Perez’ work [53–55], SR is considered a search problem, and inference rules plays the role of
heuristic procedure. In Thagard’s works [49,50], SR is viewed as the hypothesis formation by means of rules of
induction and analogy. Also, Polya’s patterns of plausible inference [35,36] can be regarded as discovery rules in
Mathematics.
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There seems to be a striking similarity between the defeasible rules proposed in DR
systems and what epistemologysts refer to as accidental generalizations or lawlike state-
ments [18]. Therefore, the analogy between defeasible reasoning and scientific prediction is
tight. At the same time, there are also similarities between ampliative inference (in particu-
lar abduction) and scientific explanation (for instance, the heuristic procedures in Lakatos’
programmes). These two reasoning tasks respectively correspond (more or less roughly) to
the explanation context and the discovery context in scientific theories [40]. In fact, these
ideas were pioneered by the American philosopher C.S. Peirce as a way to systematize
scientific procedure [14]. In this view, scientific research proceeds in three steps: accruing
evidence (inductive reasoning), looking for the best explanations for the observed evidence
(abductive reasoning) and predicting new events (deductive reasoning). It is a remarkable
fact that DR systems are aimed to extend CL by means of an ampliative inference pat-
tern based on the use of defeasible rules, but other ampliative inference patterns, of which
abduction is arguably the most important, were left out. For this reason, in this work we
mostly concentrate on the formalization of DR systems that also incorporate an abductive
inference pattern.
The formalization proposed here is aimed at the representation of the kind of features
of ampliative reasoning used in the processes of generating explanations and of changing
(or adapting) scientific theories. One of these features is the ability to draw tenable and
useful conclusions even if the body of knowledge is not known to be true, and even more,
if it is known to be untrue. Although this can be done as well in CL, the epistemic assump-
tion of the provisionality of the conclusions, and the disposition to revoke them in the case
of incorporation of new information, point towards a more general formalism. Moreover,
in the process of further acquisition of information the knowledge base may have contra-
dictory information. Since we want to avoid the trivialization of the system (by classical
inconsistency), additional procedures to weight the information for and against any tenta-
tive conclusion must become part of the process of inference, and therefore it makes again
a difference with CL. Our reasoning scheme is based on assuming a defeasible theory, con-
sisting of a closed set of first order sentences with the addition of a set of lawlike sentences
or defeasible rules, that is, expressions in which the acceptance of the antecedent may trig-
ger the acceptance of the consequent unless better reasons are found to claim its rejection.
Given a piece of evidence we look for arguments (which are, very roughly, similar to de-
ductions in CL with the only addition that they may use defeasible rules in the MP rule)
that may have led to it as a prediction. The arguments are compared and the “best” ones
(in terms of indefeasibility) are chosen and their preconditions are seen as “explanations”
for the evidence. In the interplay between argument generation and abductive hypothesis
formation, several kinds of conflicts may arise, and therefore we establish some possible
criteria for the defeat among arguments.
Despite of their many advantages, DR systems just operate syntactically over notations
and lack model-theoretic counterparts, i.e., in most cases they do not constitute logical sys-
tems [13,29,37,45,57]. For this reason we study the adequacy of the conception of partial
structures as a semantic foundation for defeasible reasoning. As a relatively recent devel-
opment in logic [7,8,31], partial structures are based on the idea that some sentences may
not have an exact truth value due to a lack or excess of information. Instead of remaining
silent about their validity, this approach assumes that these sentences can be evaluated in
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some structures that may deemed partial, in the sense that further information can be added
to them. This is particularly appropriate for the representation of scientific change, since
sometimes new evidence reduces the number or size of the extensions in which the original
claims are true.
Once our reasoning system is adequately presented, we will consider its use as a for-
malization of Lakatos’ methodology of Scientific Research Programmes (SRP) [24,25]. In
many fields of knowledge, several scientific theories may coexist, competing among them.
Each theory (and the methods of inquiry associated to it) constitutes a SRP. New pro-
grammes arise in time while others disappear, due to new discoveries and insights. Since
a scientific theory is never completely true nor completely unable to yield verifiable con-
sequences, the corresponding programme remains prone to change and evolution. This,
associated to the selective pressure of the competence among theories makes scientific in-
quiry a clear example of pragmatic reasoning. A SRP consists of a theory plus a range
of operational procedures and mechanisms of inference. Its hard core is the knowledge
set considered central for the programme and can be identified with the theory itself. The
final goal of the programme is, in fact, either to expand the core (accruing new evidence
confirming its claims) or to protect the core from negative evidence. In this last case the
negative heuristic is to build a protective belt of ancillary hypothesis that, added to the core,
yields the negative evidence as a consequence. The positive heuristic seeks, instead, to sys-
tematize the protective belt and to make it derivable from the core by means of new laws.
Therefore, the relative degree of success of a programme can be assessed by comparison
of the degree of empirical progress, or the size of the protective belt. This is particularly
important for the competition among programmes. We show how our system adequately
represents a SRP and its dynamics, refining these two heuristics. Moreover, we provide cri-
teria for representing the degree of success for selecting the most successful SRP among a
group in a given context.
2. A system for abductive defeasible reasoning
Abduction plays a central role in many applications, such as diagnosis, expert systems,
and causal reasoning [22,41]. In a very broad sense we can state that abduction is the in-
ference process that goes from observations to explanations within a more general context
or theoretical framework. That is to say, abductive inference looks for sentences (named
explanations), which, added to the theory, enable deductions for the observations. Most of
the times there are several such explanations for a given observation. For this reason, in
a narrower sense, abduction is regarded as an inference to the best explanation. Given a
theory T and an observed evidence e, then e is surprising if neither T  e, nor T  ¬e,
and e is anomalous if T  ¬e [3]. In this work we will consider abductive reasoning as
the process of hypotheses construction, and we will try to characterize the kind of reason-
ing that arises when surprising or anomalous observations are suddenly available. The first
situation has received considerable interest since Peirce, who coined the word abduction,
and characterized it as the third member of the triad of syllogistic reasoning (together with
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deduction and induction).3 The second situation (abduction of anomalous observations)
has received only occasional attention, and even less within DR systems.
There are good characterizations of abduction of surprising observations in monotonic
theories [22,28]. In normal logic programs there is a tight relationship between SLDNF
and the abduction of negative literals [20]. This relation can be generalized to the SLDNF
inference of evidence sets [12,30] and to the well-founded semantics of evidence sets [1,2].
However, a problem that faces abduction is the explanation of anomalous observations, i.e.,
observations that are contradictory with the current theory. It is a well established fact that
monotonic theories cannot accommodate anomalous observations. For this reason, research
in this direction must focus in abduction in defeasible theories. For example, Boutilier and
Becher [5] propose a belief revision approach based in the notion of proximity in modal
frameworks. In this approach, abduction of an anomalous observation is the process of
finding the least abnormal possible world given the actual world and the new observation.
Poole [37,38] proposes a logical framework where theories in which contradiction arises
are regarded as erroneous or at least incomplete. In Poole, a theory with multiple extensions
(incompatible conclusions or observations) can arise only if there is missing an explicit
exception for at least a defeasible rule, or any other kind of blocking defeater. This is
however inadequate in most contexts, where an a priori enumeration of all the possible
exceptions to the rules is impossible. For this reason, in this work we will face the crude fact
that abduction in defeasible theories may have to accommodate anomalous observations.
In this section we will give a formal characterization of a DR system, and then include an
explicit rule for abduction.
Definition 1. Defeasible rules are rules of the form a(X)>–b(X), where the antecedent
a(X) and the consequent b(X) are restricted to be sets of literals4 (interpreted as a con-
junction), and X is a tuple of free variables.
Defeasible rules can be regarded as prima facie material implications, and in our sys-
tem are used as such only for the modus ponens inference rule (that is, contraposition, left
strengthening, right weakening, and similar uses are explicitly left out). Defeasible rules
can be “fired” in MP only when their antecedent is fully instantiated, i.e., there is a ground
substitution for X such that all the literals in a(X) have been inferred. This ground instance
of a(X) is an activator for the rule. That is, neither generic nor universally quantified infer-
ences are allowed with defeasible rules. The reasoning system, then, will chain inferences
in a way very similar to (classical) deductions, with the addition of inferences in which
a fully activated defeasible rule was used. This chains of inferences are (sub)-theories in
Brewka [6] and Poole [39], and arguments in Loui [29] and Vreeswijk [57]. We will adopt
this later denomination. If a defeasible rule can be regarded as a prima facie material im-
plication, then an argument for a conclusion c is a prima facie proof or a prediction for c.
We can then extend the (classical) consequence operator  to the new operator |∼ , where
3 This short account of Peirce is surely unfair, since his purpose was much wider, for in his semiotic analysis
of inference, abduction was central as the source of creativity and new knowledge [14].
4 The reason for this restriction will be clear in the next section, but in short we can state that evidence, which
in fact is what triggers the reasoning process, can be represented only as a set of particular and definite sentences.
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E, T |∼ c means that there is an argument for c in the fixed defeasible theory T under the
given evidence E.
In DR, we may reasonably expect that these inferences will eventually generate a pair of
contradictory literals. In these cases, a comparison criteria among contradictory defeasible
conclusions can be established (see for instance Loui [29] for a set of criteria for defeat
among arguments). However, in abductive reasoning, contradictory abductive hypotheses,
and even hypotheses that are contradictory with the current theory must be considered. To
avoid (classical) trivialization, then our reasoning system must incorporate some kind of
strengthening or restriction among the structural rules. For this reasoning, we adapted a
presentation of the implicational segment of a relevant logic, similar to the R→ system
of Anderson and Belnap [4]. Then, the reiteration rule is restricted to sentences that were
inferred within the same subproof. If we need reiteration of a sentence S of a previous step
outside the subproof, then we must either introduce S as a new assumption, or reproduce
the inference steps that lead to the inference of S. To take care of this, an index schema is
established for labeling premise introduction and its ulterior discharge by means of →I .
The use of a defeasible rule is regarded as a restricted modus ponens that also introduces a
new hypothesis. The labeling schema obeys a simple set of cases (the subindices I and J
denote sets of indices, and i and j denote individual indices).
• (Premise) An hypothetical premise a is introduced with an index i never used before
(we will use the sequence of natural numbers).
• (→I ) From a (sub-)demonstration for bI from premise aj (with j ∈ I ) to infer (a →
b)I−{j}.
• (Reit.) Reiteration of a sentence retains the indices.
• (→E) In the modus ponens rule, the consequent retains the indices of the major and
the minor premises: from aI and (a → b)J to infer bI∪J .
We now add the case for defeasible rules.
Definition 2. Given a defeasible theory T (i.e., a theory that may have defeasible rules),
then we introduce the following >– elimination rule:
• (>–E ) From a (sub-)demonstration of a(t)I and a(X)>–b(X) to infer a(t) →
b(t)I∪{k}, where k is an index never used before.
Example 1. Suppose that in our knowledge base we have a, a>–b, b>– c, a>–¬c.
In this situation, we may establish the following reasoning lines:
1
2
3
4
5


a{1}
(a >–b){2}
b{1,2}
(b>–c){3}
c{1,2,3}
Premise
Defeasible rule
1,2, >–E
Defeasible rule
3,4, >–E
1
2
3
[
a{1}
(a>–¬c){4}
¬c{1,4}
Premise
Defeasible rule
1,2, >–E
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We may also use an “intuitionistic” negation introduction rule ¬I [52], according to which
if the introduction of an hypothesis leads to contradiction, then the negation of the hypoth-
esis can be inferred.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7


a{1}

(a >–b){2}
b{1,2}
(b>– c){3}
c{1,2,3}[
(a >–¬c){4}
¬c{1,4}
Premise
Defeasible rule
1,2, >–E
Defeasible rule
3,4, >–E
Defeasible rule
1,6, >–E
8 ¬a{2,3,4} 5,7,¬I
The first two reasoning lines are subsumed in the third, but we show them separately to
stress the fact that the logic is showing three possible conclusions, each one founded in
three different sets of premises. If we were able to establish comparisons of the assertive
support (i.e., the trustability) of these sets of premises, then we may choose among these
conclusions (see next section). It is remarkable that b is always a consequence of the theory,
because it is not contradictory with any other sentence (the logic will not try to reason by
contraposition with ¬c and b>– c).
Our final step is to propose a rule for abduction. The final shape of this rule is based on
several considerations. First, we want an abduction rule that finds an hypothetical explana-
tion h for a surprising observation o, that is, h together with the current theory T should
logically entail o. Second, explanations should be consistent with the current theory. Third,
explanations should not trivially entail the observation (that is, explanations together with
the theory should consistently entail the observation, but neither alone). And fourth, should
be least specific, that is, given explanation h, any other (more specific) explanation is such
that, together with the theory entails h.
Definition 3. Given a defeasible theory T (i.e., a theory that may have defeasible rules),
an abduction for an observation o should be a hypothetical explanation h that is compat-
ible with T , neither T nor h should jointly (but not separately) explain o, and any other
explanation h′ should also explain h itself:
• (Abd.) From ok to infer hS∪{k} iff
1. hS∪{k} ∪ T ⊥ (h is consistent with T )
2. T  |∼ok (there is no argument for o in T )
3. hS∪{k}  |∼ok (there is no argument for o in h)
4. T ∪ hS∪{k} |∼ok (there an argument for o in T ∪ h)
5. Any other set h′ that satisfies the four conditions above is such that h′ ∪ T |∼hS∪{k}
( i.e., h is the most “shallow” explanation for o).
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Example 2. Suppose that in a knowledge-based system we find the rulese(X)>– i(X) If X is employed, then normally X receives an income.
e(X)>– t (X) If X is employed, then normally X pays taxes.
e(X)>–¬s(X) If X is employed, then normally X does not study.
s(X)>– e(X) If X studies, then normally X is employed.
c(X)>– s(X) If X has a scholarship, then normally X studies.
c(X)>– i(X) If X has a scholarship, then normally X receives an income.
c(X)>–¬t (X) If X has a scholarship, then normally X does not pay taxes.
Given this, what can we expect about Scott, of whom we only know that he pays taxes?
1
2
3
[
t (Scott){1}
(e(X)>– t (X)){2}
e(Scott){1,2}
Premise
Defeasible rule
1,2,Abduction (Explanation)
4
5
6
[
e(Scott){1,2}
(e(X)>– i(X)){3}
i(Scott){1,2,3}
3,Reit.
Defeasible rule
4,5,→E (Prediction)
7
8
9
[
e(Scott){1,2}
(e(X)>–¬s(X)){4}
¬s(Scott){1,2,4}
3,Reit.
Defeasible rule
7,8,→E (Prediction)
By abduction, we can show that t(Scott) because e(Scott) (he pays taxes because he
is employed), and from this inference, we can predict that he has an income, and that he
does not study. It is a desirable feature here that further (iterated) abductions (for example,
c(Scott) because i(Scott)) are blocked for being contradictory.
If we know about another person, say Kim, of whom we knew only that she receives an
income, then we could generate two abductive explanations for her income. The first one,
i(Kim) because e(Kim), allows further predictions (t(Kim) and ¬s(Kim)). The second one,
i(Kim) because c(Kim), allows other predictions (s(Kim) and ¬t (Kim)). In this situation
we have two unrelated explanations, of which we cannot choose one over the other (again,
see next section). However, knowing further that, for instance, s(Kim), will block the first
explanation in favor of the second.
3. Some issues regarding abductive explanation
In this section we will pose some characteristics that distinguish abductive reason-
ing in defeasible theories from other kinds of DR, and from nonmonotonic reasoning in
general. Regarding our last example, it is reasonable that a theory will generate different
incompatible explanations, establish new predictions from previous explanations, and even
block some of these new predictions given new facts. The first of these issues regards the
problem of multiple extensions [6]. These had been considered an undesirable feature of
nonmonotonic theories in general. For this reason, there is a growing interest on finding
adequate comparison criteria among extensions [29,39,45]. When there are two or more
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unrelated defeasible arguments with contradictory conclusions, then it is hard to accept or
believe any of the conclusions.
However, in abductive reasoning (defeasible or not), it is natural (and indeed desirable)
to have multiple explanations. This may arise when more than one activator can gener-
ate a defeasible argument whose conclusion is the surprising observation. Each of these
activators gives rise to a new and different extension of the context of the theory.
Example 3 (A slight modification of Nixon’s diamond [19]). Suppose we have the follow-
ing defeasible theory:
T = {Quaker(X)>– pacifist(X),
Republican(X)>–¬pacifist(X),
hawk(X)>–¬pacifist(X)}.
• If we have evidence E = {Quaker(Dick),Republican(Dick)}, then we can generate
two defeasible arguments that respectively justify, pacifist(Dick) and ¬pacifist(Dick).
However, none of these conclusions is compatible with the context T ∪E, and for this
reason no tenable extension can be generated.
• However if we have evidence E = {¬pacifist(Dick)}, then there exist two defeasible
abductive explanations Republican(Dick) and hawk(Dick). Each of them separately,
their conjunction, and also their disjunction, raise an extension that is consistent with
the context.
Another remarkable difference arises among the strength of defeasible explanations and
defeasible predictions. We may claim that—quite on the contrary of what happens with
strict implications and monotonic theories—in nonmonotonic theories, an abductive ex-
planation is in general stronger than a prediction (implication).
Example 4. Suppose we use a defeasible rule to represent the odds of catching the SARS
on a trip to China.
T = {went_to_China(X)>– got_SARS(X)}.
• If we have evidence that Jack did in fact go to China E = {went_to_China(Jack)}, then
we may defeasible conclude (predict) that he got the SARS, got_SARS(Jack).
• In turn, if we have evidence that Jack in fact got the SARS E = {got_SARS(Jack)},
then our abductive explanation is that it is because he went to China went_to_China
(Jack).
Which of the reasoning lines seems stronger?
There is also the issue of the accrual of reasons, i.e., the idea that two or more argu-
ments supporting the same conclusion give more strength to the conclusion in case there
are also arguments against the conclusion. In nonmonotonic reasoning, this heuristic was
proposed by Pollock [33,34] and Verheij [56], but lately they abandoned this idea, and now
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nobody believes that accrual of reasons is an adequate comparison mechanism. In abduc-
tive reasoning, we can certainly have an accrual of explanations, i.e., the case where an
abductive explanation for a surprising fact f , is also an explanation for new observed but
previously unpredicted facts.
Example 5. Suppose we have the following defeasible theory.
T = {a(X)>–¬b(X),
a(X)>–c(X),
a(X)>–d(X),
e(X)>–d(X)
}
.
If we are now confronted with the observation d(t), then there exist two possible abductive
explanations a(t) and e(t). a(t) activates also the new predictions ¬b(t) and c(t). For
this reason, in scientific reasoning a(t) will be preferable because of its larger empirical
progress.
In the context of scientific explanation, this progress is regarded by many as the supreme
virtue of a scientific theory, notwithstanding refutation. If we had evidence b(t), c(t) and
d(t), the only consistent explanation is e(t), but a(t) will continue to be preferred because
it explains more observable facts, in spite of the fact that it has a counterexample.
Another interesting issue regarding abductive explanations considers the trustability or
plausibility assessment of hypotheses. This can be done only rejecting information, either
in the theory, or in the evidence, or even some of the hypotheses themselves. Rescher [42]
coined the term exduction to describe this reasoning pattern. It is remarkable to note that
exduction is a demonstrative deductive inference (the consequences are always a proper
subset of the premises), but is also nonmonotonic (the addition of new premises may lead
to the withdrawal of previous conclusions).
An obvious rational policy for consistency reinstauration is to reject the least set of
premises, and among them, those whose rejection implies the least information loss. If
every premise comes together with an index that determines its assertive support, then
we have a plausible reasoning system, where the premises to reject will be those with
the lower index. Examples of plausible reasoning systems can be found in [10,43,44]. In
[10], the plausible reasoning system P is also adequate to be embedded in defeasible and
nonmonotonic reasoning, and also can be adapted here to hold the problem of multiple
incompatible abductions, and to give a more formal ground to the standard definition of
abduction as “reasoning to the best explanation”.
The basis of the system P is to regard evidence (ground literals) as provided by informa-
tion sources which are partially interrelated by a trustability or support relation. Plausibility
is an adequate term to refer to the assertive support of a sentence provided by a more or less
trustable information source. The consistency reinstating policy is to reject the set of least
plausible premises. Such a policy is the case in commonsense reasoning. When faced to
contradictory opinions, we usually reject the least trustful report. That means that the report
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is not judged by the purported information itself, but by the source informing it.5 When
confronted with contradictory information, then, the system P generates the maximally
consistent subsets under the (deductive or defeasible) closure, compares them under the
plausibility relation, and suggests the most plausible maximally consistent subset. In [10],
a computational procedure for testing if a given sentence is in this subset is also provided.
These results can be easily adapted to the framework of abductive reasoning proposed
in this paper. The evidence triggering an abductive explanation, and the defeasible rules
involved in the generation of the explanation, provides an assertive support for the expla-
nation. Therefore, explanations can be compared with respect to their plausibility, and the
“best” one is the most plausible. However, as we will see in the next section, there are more
issues involved in the defeat among abductive explanations, that require further discussion.
4. Defeat among abductive explanations
As we already stated, defeat among explanations is a central issue in our abductive rea-
soning system. In particular, we need to regard the comparison among abductive arguments
in a defeasible theory, leading to the possibility of iterating abductive inferences. In Sec-
tion 2, we introduced a “shallow” abductive operator which is very limited in scope, but
can be iterated to produce “deeper” explanations.
Example 6 (After [22] and [32]). Suppose we have the following theory:
{
r(T )>– wr(T ), (if it rains, the road is wet),
r(T )>– wl(T ), (if it rains, the lawn is wet),
r(T )>–¬s(T ), (if it rains, it’s not sunny),
s(T )>–¬r(T ), (if it’s sunny, it does not rain),
so(T )>– wl(T ), (if the sprinklers are on, the lawn is wet),
s(T )∧ h(T )>– so(T ), (if it’s sunny and hot, the sprinklers are on),
wl(T )>– ws(T ), (if the lawn is wet, the shoes are wet),
wr(T )>– ws(T )
}
(if the road is wet, the shoes are wet).
In this situation, suppose we observe that our shoes are wet (E = ws(today)). The pos-
sible (shallow) explanations for this are that either the road is wet, or that the lawn is wet,
or both. However, none of these suffices to generate a “most specific” explanation.
To generate a more specific explanation we can iterate the abductive inference, that is, to
generate a new “evidence” set E′ that contains E plus any of the independently generated
5 This is the main difference between plausible reasoning and probabilistic reasoning or Bayesian inference
[15,21]. In plausible reasoning the epistemic value of a sentence is external, i.e., it is unrelated to the intensional
content of the sentence. In probabilistic reasoning, for example, the probability assigned to an event is internal
since it relates the event with its reference class.
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explanations, and then use this new context to try to generate a new abductive explanation.
This procedure may be easy to formalize, but, as we will see, it may happen that another ar-
guments are conflicting with some of these abductive hypotheses, and therefore a criterion
for combining defeat should be taken into account.
Example 7 (After [16], with slight modifications). Let us consider the following theory{
Q(X)>–p(X), (Quakers are pacifists),
Q(X)>– rel(X), (Quakers are religious),
R(X)>–b(X), (Republicans are belicists),
p(X)>–¬b(X), (pacifists are not belicists),
b(X)>–¬p(X), (belicists are not pacifists),
b(X)>– gw(X), (belicists support Gulf war),
b(X)>– pm(X), (belicists are politically motivated),
p(X)>– pm(X)
}
(pacifists are politically motivated).
Suppose that our starting point is the observation that Dick is politically motivated
(pm(Dick)), and that we believe that an explanation for this is Dick being a Quaker
(Q(Dick)).
However, new information leads us to accept that Dick supports Gulf war (gw(Dick)).
This is not an anomalous observation (¬gw(Dick) was not conclusion of our belief state),
but any attempt to find an abductive explanation for the new observation will force us to
change beliefs. In particular, the only possible explanation is (b(Dick)), which generates a
conflict with our previous beliefs. In this state of affairs, we have two competing arguments.
A1 =
{
Q(Dick) (previous assumption),
Q(Dick)>– rel(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
Q(Dick)>–p(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
p(Dick)>–¬b(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
p(Dick)>– pm(Dick)
}
(confirmed prediction).
A2 =
{
gw(Dick) (new observation),
b(Dick)>– gw(Dick) (abductive explanation),
b(Dick)>–¬p(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
b(Dick)>– pm(Dick)
}
(confirmed prediction).
The possible conclusions to which we could arrive in this competition between A1 and
A2 can be grouped in three cases.
I. We keep accepting Q(Dick) but we reject the abductive explanation b(Dick) because it
is the consequence of a weak inference pattern (an abduction) which is contradictory
with other knowledge. Then, the explanation for gw(Dick) must come from another
rule, still unknown.
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II. Quite on the contrary, we accept b(Dick) and reject Q(Dick) because it was in fact the
conclusion of a weak inference (an argument).
III. We accept the abductive explanation b(Dick) and continue to believe that Q(Dick),
but we reject that the later is a reason to reject the former (i.e., we reject the ar-
gument {Q(Dick)>–p(Dick),p(Dick)>–¬b(Dick)}, thus establishing the conjecture
that some kind of exception must be the case here (Dick is a kind of belicist Quaker).
Suppose now that our previous assumption that explains pm(Dick), was R(Dick),
and that the new observation is rel(Dick). This observation is not anomalous (because
¬rel(Dick) is not conclusion of this belief state). However, any abductive explanation will
again force us to change belief, in particular we can only explain rel(Dick) with (Q(Dick)),
which conflicts with our previous beliefs. We have then two competing arguments.
A3 =
{
R(Dick) (assumption),
R(Dick)>–b(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
b(Dick)>– dm(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
b(Dick)>–¬p(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
b(Dick)>– pm(Dick)
}
(confirmed prediction).
A4 =
{
rel(Dick) (observation),
Q(Dick)>– rel(Dick) (abductive explanation),
Q(Dick)>–p(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
p(Dick)>–¬b(Dick) (prediction to be confirmed),
p(Dick)>– pm(Dick)
}
(confirmed prediction).
In this competence between arguments we can arrive at the following group of conclu-
sions.
I. We keep accepting R(Dick) but we reject the abductive explanation Q(Dick) because
it is the consequence of a weak inference pattern and is contradictory with other knowl-
edge. Then, the explanation for rel(Dick) must come from another rule, still unknown.
II. Quite on the contrary, we accept Q(Dick) and reject R(Dick) because it was conse-
quence of a defeasible argument.
III. We accept the abductive explanation b(Dick) and continue to believe that R(Dick),
but we reject that the later is a reason to reject the former or vice versa (i.e., we re-
ject both the argument {Q(Dick)>–p(Dick),p(Dick)>–¬b(Dick)}—Dick is a kind
of belicist Quaker—and the argument {R(Dick)>–b(Dick), b(Dick)>–¬p(Dick)}—
Dick is a kind of pacifist Republican).
We can summarize the possible strategies to solve the conflicts between abductive infer-
ence and arguments. Any of these can be arguably supported or rejected as the underlying
rationale for a DR system, in particular, as the reasoning methodology of a scientific re-
search programme.
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I. We include only the abductive inferences that do not generate conflicting arguments
with previous beliefs.
II. We consider that abductive inferences are defeaters for arguments that supported pre-
vious beliefs.
III. Conclusions of arguments and abductive explanations are on an equal footing, and if
there are contradictions, then they must be attributed to an exception in one or more
defeasible rules.
Given this, we may now cope with the problem of iterating abductive inferences within
a defeasible theory. In particular, we want to know if, under those defeat strategies, given a
defeasible theory T , a set of evidence E, and a background underlying (strict) knowledge
K, we will eventually reach a stable situation in which no more abductions are needed to
explain the observations, the explanations of those observations, and so on. First, we have
to give a precise definition of what distinguishes an observation from plain evidence. In our
case, an observation is a knowledge piece that, instead of being the ground of an argument
that may predict (or retrodict) another piece of evidence, is in fact the possible conclusion
of an argument whose basis is in E, or is so far unknown or is perhaps incompatible with
other knowledge.
Definition 4. Given a context T ∪ E with an underlying knowledge K. An observation
o ∈ E is a ground literal that can be substituted for a literal present in the consequence of
any defeasible rule in T .
Then, given an observation o ∈ E, it may be that o is justified (predicted) by an argument
whose activator is fully in E. If not, the observation may be “surprising” and we expect
that the above definitions will allow us to reach a stable and coherent explanation for o,
perhaps iterating our abductive procedure. In the case of an anomalous observation o, then
we know that o is conflicting with the conclusion of at least one argument that is fully
activated by the evidence, and therefore that a coherent and stable situation is not likely to
occur (we will cope with that problem in the next section).
Definition 5. Given a context T ∪E with an underlying knowledgeK, and an observation
o ∈ E. Then H is an explanation for o iff H is a set of ground literals such that
• H,K  o,
• H,K,T |∼o.
H is the most general explanation if H is the activator for a rule in T which has o as
its consequent, and is the most specific explanation if it is not possible to substitute at least
one of the literals in H by the consequent of any of the rules in T .
Example 8. Consider the case in which
T = {a(X)>–b(X),
b(X)>–c(X)
}
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and the observation o = c(t). In this case the most general explanation is b(t) and the most
specific explanation is a(t).
Example 9. Consider the case in which
T = {a(X)>–b(X), b(X)>–c(X),
d(X)>– e(X), e(X)>–f (X), c(X),f (X)>–g(X)
}
and the observation o = g(t). In this case the most general explanation is c(t), f (t) and
the only most specific explanation is a(t), d(X).
Given a context and an observation o, then there may exist most specific explanations H
only when H ⊆ E. However, the converse situation is not the case. Consider the following
situation.
Example 10. Suppose the defeasible theory
T = {a(X)>–b(X),
b(X)>– c(X),
a(X)>–¬c(X)}.
If we look for a most specific explanation for the observation c(t), then we find that a(t)
may be such explanation, given that there exists an argument 〈c(t), a(t)>–b(t), b(t)>–
c(t)〉. However, if we assume a(t) as an explanation, then the argument 〈¬c(t), a(t)>–
¬c(t)〉 defeats the former argument (by specificity defeat [29,39,45]), and therefore the
assumption a(t) is not the desired explanation.
This example shows that the non-locality of argumentative reasoning adds a new diffi-
culty to the process of finding the most specific explanations. In fact, this is the very reason
why these explanations should be reached only iterating the most general explanation pro-
cedure.
Definition 6. Given a context T ∪ E with an underlying knowledgeK. Then
1. The set of argumentative supported conclusions Ac are generated from E ∪ T .
2. The set of abductive explanations Bc are generated from E ∪ T .
3. If there is a pair of contradictory literals a ∈ Ac and b ∈ Bc , then either
(I) Any argument A for a defeats any argument generated with b.
(II) Any argument generated with b defeats any argument generated with a.
(III) Any of the defeasible rules used in the arguments for a or in the explanations for
b is defeated (syntactically blocked).
4. Firm conclusions C are the members of Ac and Bc that were not defeated in 3.
If we need to iterate abduction, then the firm conclusions C are added to the “evidence” E,
and the process is repeated.
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Example 11. Suppose we are in the situation of Example 6, and we observe that our shoes
are wet (ws(today)), and we remember that today it was sunny (s(today)). Then, what can
we conclude? The most general abductive explanations are wr(today) and wl(today). At
the moment, any of these explanations is compatible with the observations and there is
no defeat. If we iterate the abductive process, we find that r(today) is an explanation for
wr(today), and r(today) or so(today) are explanations for wl(today).
Following strategy I, we assimilate so(today) as the only tenable explanation for
ws(today), that is, we conjecture that the sprinkler was on, it got the lawn wet, and then
our shoes got wet. If we push this further, we can also conjecture that today it was hot
in addition to being sunny. Instead, if we follow strategy II, then the explanation r(today)
blocks our remembrance of being sunny. Then, our explanation now is that it rained, the
rain got the road and the lawn wet, and then our shoes got also wet. If we use strategy
III, then both previous explanations are valid and compatible, and we reject the rules that
mutually exclude r(today) and s(today), that is, we suppose that today it may be hot and
sunny at one time, and rainy at another.
Now, an important characterization of this process is to determine when and why is it
possible to find a stable justification for an observation that is consistent with the context.
Definition 7. Given a context T ∪ E with an underlying knowledge K. Given a surprising
observation o (that is, an observation that is compatible with the context but not justified
therein), we will say that there is a stable justification H for o if there exist at least one
most specific explanation H that is not contradictory with the context.
Theorem 1. An exhaustive iteration of the procedure in Definition 6 will find any stable
justification, if there exists one.
Proof. If H is a stable justification, then it is a nontrivial, most specific explanation, com-
patible with the context. That is:
1. H,K  o.
2. H,K,T ,E |∼o (nontrivial explanation).
3. Literals in H are not substituible for literals in the consequent of any rule in T (most
specific explanation).
4. It is not possible to generate arguments from H,E,T for a set of literals C such that
C,K  ⊥ (explanation consistent with the context).
If there exists such an H , then it is possible to build a tree that has o in its root, the literals
in H are some of its leaves, the other leaves are literals in E, every link is a ground instance
of a rule in T , and any interior node is a set ci of ground instances of consequences of rules
in T that deduces the activator cj of another rule in T (that is, K, ci  cj , see Fig. 1).
Under these conditions, we wish to prove that if there exists a set H with that proper-
ties, then the procedure of Definition 6 will find it, and if the procedure fails, then there
does not exist any H that satisfies the previous conditions. It is easy to see that the proce-
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dure generates a breadth-first traverse of the tree. Therefore it is possible to show this by
induction.
When the procedure is applied for the first time (on the observation o), step 1 generates
all the descendants B of o, and step 2 culls the descendants that are not compatible with the
context. If there are no literals left, then there is no stable justification and the procedure
fails. If at least one literal is left, then the whole procedure is again applied on every branch.
Therefore by induction we see that either all the generated descendants were eventually
culled (there is no stable justification, and the procedure fails), or there is a set of literals
H that is descendant of o, none of the literals in H is substituible for consequents of
rules in T , and every literal in H is compatible with the context. Under this situation, H
together with E are the leaves of the tree that has o as the root, and therefore H is the
stable justification for o. 
Therefore, any explanation for an anomalous observation (incompatible with the con-
text) entails a modification of the context (this will be discussed in the following section).
5. Abduction of anomalous observations
Finding explanations for anomalous observations is certainly one of the most important
topics in SR, where theories rise and fall when new observations need to be accommo-
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dated to an established corpus. The most simple situation where we have an anomalous
observation is the following.
Example 12. Our defeasible theory T contains a rule a(X)>–b(X), the evidence E con-
tains the literal a(t), and the observation ¬b(t) which we wish to justify.
Here, the only possible choices are to reject the observation (because it is anomalous),
to reject the evidence (because it is untenable given the theory and the observation), or to
regard the individual t to be an exception to the rule. In most cases, the first choice is pre-
ferred (and we can argue that the procedure of Definition 6 is in tune with this). However,
it is important to discuss the other two alternatives in the case that anomalous observations
are copious or persistent enough to force a sensible update of the theory. Rejection of the
evidence, or rejection of the rule, does not entail an explanation for the observation, but at
least forces the theory to cease predicting the negation of the observation.
The following result is a corollary of Theorem 1:
Theorem 2. Given a context T ∪ E with an underlying knowledge K, and an anomalous
observation o ∈ E. Under these conditions, either o is rejected (because ¬o is predicted
given the context) or the context must be updated to accommodate for o (some literals in E
should be abandoned or ground terms in o should be considered as exceptional for some
rules in T ).
Proof. If o is anomalous, then there is no stable justification H for o. If we are not in the
disposition for modifying the context, then we are in the situation considered in Theorem 1
and therefore o is unexplained.
But suppose that we wish to grant that o is compatible with the context. Since o is
anomalous, for every argument for o in the context there exists at least a defeater argument
for ¬o. Therefore, there must exist at least an argument for ¬o that should be rejected to
accommodate o. And the only way to discard an argument is either rejecting some literals
in the evidence in a way such that the argument is no longer activated, or blocking any of
the rules activated in the argument, considering that o is an exception to that rule. 
Then, any procedure for finding explanations for anomalous observations should modify
the priorities among abduced literals and argument-generated literals.
Definition 8 (Explanation for anomalous observations). Given a context T ∪ E with an
underlying knowledge K, and an anomalous observation o ∈ E. In this case
1. The set of argumentative supported conclusions Ac are generated from E ∪ T .
2. The set of abductive explanations Bc are generated from E ∪ T .
3. Since o was anomalous, then there must be disagreement between at least a literal
a ∈ Ac and a literal b ∈ Bc (that is, a, b,K  ⊥). In this case, either
(a) Any abductive inference for literals b ∈ Bc defeats any argument T for a, or
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(b) Let TT ∈ T be the subset of defeasible rules used in every argument T for a. Then
there exists at least one rule in TT that is syntactically blocked (o is regarded as an
exception for this rule).
4. The set of firm conclusions are the undefeated members of Ac and Bc .
The choice 3(a) corresponds to the design of a system in which abduction from obser-
vations defeats evidence, and choice 3(b) corresponds to a system in which contradiction
among evidence and observations blocks defeasible rules in the specific ground case. As
with the previous section’s results, the final choices are in fact left to the specific design of
a reasoning system.
Example 13 (Example 12 revisited). Our theory T has only one defeasible rule a(X)>–
b(X), the evidence set E contains a(t) and ¬b(t). Under this condition we can choose case
3(a) of the definition above, and therefore conclude that a(t) should be erroneous. Instead,
if we choose case 3(b), then both pieces of evidence are accepted, and we postulate that
the rule a(X)>–b(X) is exceptional with respect to the individual t .
Example 14 (Example 7 revisited). Suppose we are again with the defeasible theory T
of Example 7. In this situation, if in our evidence E we get to know that Dick is Quaker
(Q(Dick)) an that he supports Gulf wars (gw(Dick)), then, a most specific explanation
for gw(Dick) is that Dick is a belicist, which is contradictory to an argument based on
evidence that Dick is Quaker. In this point, we can solve this conflict adopting case 3(a).
This implies rejecting the contradictory evidence Q(Dick) and performing an abduction
from the observation sw(Dick), which produces the explanation b(Dick). Further pursuing
of this line of argumentation allows the more specific explanation R(Dick). Instead, if
we choose case 3(b), then we assume that our knowledge about political attitudes has
exceptions in Dick, either because he is a nonpacifist Quaker or because he is a “belicist
pacifist”.
6. A semantics for defeasible reasoning6
Defeasible reasoning, and in particular scientific reasoning frequently adopts a semantic
attitude. That is, conclusions are accepted as justified as long as they hold in their intended
domain of reference. To reason in this framework involves the epistemic decision to accept
conclusions even if it is known that their interpretations in the intended domain are not
completely determined. That is, conclusions may be provisionally accepted so long they
hold in the fragment of the domain whose knowledge is well established. This approach
is known as the partial structures approach [7–9,31]. In this section we show how partial
structures could provide an adequate semantics for justification in defeasible reasoning.
Given a domain of knowledge, consisting of a class of objects, D, and the relations among
them, it is frequent the case in which it is unknown whether each relation is verified by
each relevant tuple of objects. It is said that such relations are partial:
6 This section is a brief account of [51].
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Definition 9. A partial relation R of arity n can be represented as R = 〈R1,R2,R3〉, such
that Ri ∩ Rj = ∅ for i, j : 1, 2, 3, i = j , and R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3 =Dn, where
• R1 is the set of n-tuples that we know belong to R.
• R2 is the set of n-tuples that we know do not belong to R.
• R3 is the set of n-tuples that are not known either to belong to R or not.
That is, a partial relation partitions Dn into three sets. One is the set of elements that
belong to the relation. The second set is the set of elements that are not in the relation.
The third set consists of those elements that are not known to be in the relation or in its
complement. It is clear that when no uncertainty exist, R3 = ∅ and R verifies the usual
definition of a relation. Structures which include partial relations are said pragmatic:
Definition 10. A pragmatic structure is of the form 〈D, {Ri}i∈I ,K ∪ E〉, where D = ∅ is
the universe of the structure, {Ri}i∈I is the family of partial relations over D and K ∪ E is
the set of sentences accepted in the structure, called primary sentences.7
The set of primary sentences K ∪ E includes all the statements that are accepted in a
given context. They may be universal statements (those in K) or ground literals (in E). K∪
E constraints the possible extensions of a partial structure, because the derived sentences in
any feasible extension should be consistent with K ∪ E. Each possible extension is called
a normal structure:
Definition 11. Given a pragmatic structure P = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I ,K ∪ E〉, a structure P ′ =
〈D′, {R′i}i∈I 〉 is said a P-normal structure if
1. D =D′.
2. Every constant is interpreted as the same object in P and P ′.
3. Each R′i extends Ri i.e., R1i ⊆ R′1i , R2i ⊆ R′2i and R′3i = ∅.
But only some of the normal structures are admissible, namely those that support sen-
tences that are consistent with the primary sentences K ∪ E. These sentences are said
quasi-true (or pragmatically true):
Definition 12. Given a P-normal structure P ′, we say that it is admissible if P ′  α for
each α ∈ K ∪ E.8 A sentence φ ∈ L is quasi-true (quasi-false) relative to P according to
an admissible extension P ′ if P ′  φ (P ′  φ).
Moreover, we have that pragmatic validity can be defined as follows:
7 These sentences belong to a first-order language L such that its interpretation in 〈D, {Ri}i∈I ,K〉 consist in
associating each constant of L with an element in D while each predicate symbol of arity n is associated to a
relation Ri of the same arity.
8  is the classical (or Tarskian) model-theoretic consequence relation.
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Definition 13. A sentence φ is pragmatically valid (in symbols, P T φ) if φ is quasi-true
relative to P according to every possible admissible P-normal structure. φ is pragmati-
cally countervalid (P F φ) if φ is quasi-false relative to P according to every possible
admissible P-normal structure, that is, if for every P-normal structure P ′ such that P ′  α
for each α ∈K∪E we have that P ′  φ. Otherwise, φ is said pragmatically undetermined,
P u φ.
The change in pragmatic validity due to the incorporation of new primary sentences is
in fact restricted only to pragmatic indeterminacy:
Property. Let P = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I ,K ∪ E〉 and P¯ = 〈D, {Ri}i∈I , (K ∪ E)′〉 be two prag-
matic structures, which differ only in that (K ∪ E)′ =K ∪ E ∪ {ψ}, where ψ is such that
K,E,ψ ⊥. Then, for any sentence φ, if P T φ (P F φ) then P¯  φ (P¯ F φ).
Proof. Consider an admissible extension for P¯ , say P∗. Since P and P¯ differ only in their
accepted sentences, we have that P∗ must also be an extension for P . Since it is admissible
for P¯ , P∗  α for each α ∈K ∪ E ∪ {ψ} and therefore (since  is the classical semantic
consequence relation) P∗  α for each α ∈ K ∪ E. Therefore, P∗ is admissible for P .
Finally, if we assume P T φ we have that, in particular, P∗  φ, which implies that φ is
quasi-true relative also to P¯ according to P∗. Since P∗ is any admissible extension for P¯
it follows that P¯ T φ. 
Therefore, additional information (in the form of new primary sentences) may have only
the effect of eliminating the pragmatic uncertainty of the sentences that are interpretable in
the partial structure. At the same time, since the new sentence constraints the admissibility
of extensions, its addition to K ∪ E has the side-effect of reducing the number of admis-
sible extensions. Although the abductive reasoning system described in previous sections
is a purely syntactic procedure and does not constitute a logical system, it can be seen
as the basis for one. A way of characterizing the behavior of the procedure introduced in
Definition 13 is by means of the following notion of model:
Definition 14. Given the class of ground literals in L, a model M for defeasible reasoning
is:
M = 〈W, [| |],Ch〉
where W contains all the finite sets w of ground literals such that w ∩ E = ∅, and there is
no ground literal l, such that both l and ¬l are in w. The interpretation correspondence [| |]
is such that for any literal l, [|l|] = {w} such that w is a justification for l. Ch, the choice
function, yields, for each ground literal l, all the w ∈ W that justifies l.
In other words, every justification is a possible world w ∈ W , which is a contradiction-
free set of ground literals including some literals from the evidence set. Each literal l is
interpreted as all the worlds that constitute justifications for it, while the choice function
distinguishes, among these worlds, those that justifies l. This semantics summarizes (in Ch)
the behavior of the procedure of finding (abductive or argumentative) justifications. Since
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defeasible reasoning is seen here as part of a methodology of commonsense reasoning—
which is frequently carried out in interpreted domains—it seems convenient to introduce a
semantics that refers to some field beyond the syntax. This field is the intended domain of
the grounded literals that may obtain from defeasible theory within the given context.
7. Research Programmes reconstructed
We will now consider DR systems in general our abductive system in particular as a
possible basis for a formal reconstruction of Lakatos’ epistemology of Scientific Research
Programmes (SRP) [24,25]. Scientific statements can be schematically classified as being
of three classes [11]. The first one involves the particular statements that describe states of
affairs. They usually adopt the form of ground atomic formulae. A formula of this class
states that its terms (representing objects or entities) verify its prepositional function (rep-
resenting properties, features, etc.). The class of statements of this type is denoted N1.
A second class of statements involves those that represent empirical generalizations.
That is, it includes the lawlike statements9 relating observational terms and relations. Thus
a statement of the form “Objects that have the observable property p normally have prop-
erty q .” can be represented with a prima facie implication p(X)>–q(X) where p and q
are observable properties and X is a variable that can be substituted for a term.10 State-
ments of this type form the class that we denote by N2. These sentences can be used with
the modus ponens inference rule only when p(X) can be inferred for a ground substitution
for X. The resulting chains of inferences are isomorphic to standard deductions, and are
named (defeasible) theories or arguments.
Finally, statements in N3 represent the theoretical propositions. That is, their validity
is not subject to direct observation. Statements at this level constitute the hard core of re-
search programmes. Included here are the statements that establish the connection between
theoretical and observational statements (these are usually called the “bridge principles”).
Carl Hempel defined a scientific theory as a covering by statements of a corresponding
evidence set E, which it intends to systematize [17,18]. That is, a theory constitutes a
corpus of hypothetical knowledge from which all the evidence should be deducible under
the standard first order consequence relation . Namely, if the theory is T ⊆N2 ∪N3 it
must be such that for each e ∈ E ⊆N1, T  e. If e has been already observed, T provides
an retrodiction for it, while otherwise it yields a prediction of e.
Imre Lakatos presented, in the early 70s, a challenge to both the falsationism of Karl
Popper and the analysis of scientific revolutions advanced by Thomas Kuhn. In fact, he
took the most significant ideas from both, but leaving aside the rigidity of the former and
the sociological burden of the latter [25]. On the descriptive side he showed that in a given
field of knowledge several theories may coexist, in a mutual competing state. Each theory,
9 In many fields of inquiry it is customary to use probabilistic laws. Since this introduces a higher degree of
precision than what is actually needed to describe Lakatos’ methodology we will not use them in our presentation.
10 This definition can be slightly generalized to the case where X stands for a tuple of variables, and both p(X)
and q(X) are sets (conjunctions) of literals.
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and the associated methods of inquiry, constitute a programme. It is reasonable to expect
that new programmes arise while others disappear, due to new discoveries and insights.
Scientific theories are never completely true nor completely unable to yield verifiable
consequences. For this reason, research programmes remain open to change and evolution.
In addition to this, there is also a selective pressure arising from competition among pro-
grammes. Thus, a scientific discipline can be regarded as the dynamic quest of a group
of programmes to increase their success (degree of confirmation, empirical progress, or
whatever).
A scientific research programme (SRP) consists of a theory plus a range of operational
procedures and inference mechanisms. Its hard core is the knowledge set considered cen-
tral for the programme and can be identified with the theory itself. The final goal of the
programme is, in fact, to either expand the core (accruing new evidence confirming its
claims) or to protect the core from refutatory evidence. Following Lakatos, two heuristics
may be applied to confront the theory with the evidence. If e is not correctly explained or
predicted, the negative heuristic prescribes to look for a new hypothesis c ∈N1 such that
now T , c  e. The set of these auxiliary hypotheses, C is the protective belt of T . That, is
C “protects” T from refutation. That is, if evidence e is not a consequence of the theory T ,
the negative heuristic is to find an hypothesis h such that from the theory plus h it follows
that e. The positive heuristic, instead, seeks to systematize the protecting belt and make it
a consequence of the core by means of new laws. In fact, if this goal is achieved, what for-
merly constituted the protecting belt becomes part of the area of knowledge dominated and
systematized by the hard core of the programmes. This means that new inferences should
be drawn from T while at the same time C must lead to a set of law like statement S ⊆N2
such that the theory is extended to T ′ = T ∪S . Notice that according to the negative heuris-
tic the programme enlarges C. The positive heuristic, instead, “discharges” C and enlarges
the scope of the hard core. To summarize: we define a programme as P = 〈T ,C,E〉, that
is, characterized by a theory, its protective belt and the set of available evidence. Notice
that since T ⊆N2 ∪N3, the hard core is T¯ ⊆ T such that T¯ ⊆N3.
Therefore, the size of the protective belt is certainly an indicator of the relative suc-
cess of a programme (the explanatory power and the empirical progress being other good
indicators of the success of a programme). This is particularly important for the com-
petition among programmes. A theory whose protective belt steadily diminish, or whose
explanatory and empirical power steadily increase, becomes a progressive programme,
which competes advantageously with rival programmes. In turn, if a theory whose belt
increases because it continuously needs to be subject to the application of the negative
heuristic, becomes a degenerating programme, which is certainly prone to be abandoned.
Thus, more progressive programmes gradually achieve more credibility and support, and
therefore replace the less successful ones (which are not refuted but abandoned). In this
section we show how our system may adequately represent a SRP and the dynamics estab-
lished in these two heuristics. Moreover, we provide some criteria for selecting the most
successful among a group of SRP in a given context.
Therefore, a SRP P can be represented as a defeasible theory and a protective belt of
ancillary ad hoc hypotheses. Here we regard defeasible rules as the representation of sci-
entific rules (accidental generalizations, statistical rules, and so on). Suppose that under
evidence E1 ⊆ E there is an argument for the (set of) ground literal(s) e1. This is denoted
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by T ,C,⋃E1 |∼ e1. In this case we say that the programme P predicts (or retrodicts) the
observable fact e1 given the previous evidence that E1 is verified. It should be noted that
because of the nature of defeasible rules, there may be programmes that in certain cases
predict both an observation and its negation.11 Therefore, if a conclusion is to be drawn
it must arise as a result of a process of comparison among arguments. This means that an
order relation among arguments must be defined such that A1  A2 iff A1 defeats A2. In
this work we considered only specificity defeater. The reader may consult for instance the
work of Loui [29], where other kinds of defeaters are considered (more evidence, direct-
ness, and preferred subarguments), which can be included in the following discussion if
needed.
Given a programme P and a literal l, then l is predicted (or explained) by P if
there is an argument in P for l. Therefore we can expect that in a given situation, the
“prepositional attitudes” that P may assume with respect to an observable should be defi-
nite.
Definition 15. Given a programme P and an observable literal l we define
Definitive Defeasible
Accept l Arguments only for l Arguments both for l and for ¬l
but exists an undefeated argument for l
Accept ¬l Arguments only for ¬l Arguments both for l and for ¬l
but exists an undefeated argument for ¬l
Undecided No arguments, neither for l Arguments both for l and ¬l
nor for ¬l but there are no undefeated arguments
The next step is to classify the “status” that the experimental confirmation of an observ-
able impinges on a programme.
Definition 16. Given a programme P and an observable l, if l is in fact observed, then
Prediction of P Status of P after the observation
Definitive accept l Confirmed
Defeasible accept l Partially confirmed
Definitive accept ¬l Severe anomaly
Defeasible accept ¬l Partial anomaly
Definitive indecision Surprising fact
Defeasible indecision “Lacuna”12
Example 15. Suppose that our programme has the knowledge K = {penguin(X) →
bird(X)}.
Our defeasible theory T about flying properties is:
T1 =
{
bird(X)>– flies(X),
11 Consider for instance the very well-known example where we have the defeasible rules birds fly and penguins
don’t fly.
12 This terminology is borrowed from Kuipers [23].
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penguin(X)>–¬flies(X),
in_airplane(X)>– flies(X)}.
Finally, the evidence relevant to our programme is:
Ed =
{
penguin(Opus),
bird(Pint),
bird(Tweety),
penguin(Schmuck),
in_airpline(Schmuck)
}
.
Our programme has an argument for flies(Opus) (because it is a bird), but a more specific
defeater argument for ¬flies(Opus) (because it is a penguin). Therefore our programme
defeasibly accepts ¬flies(Opus). There is an argument for flies(Tweety) and therefore
the programme definitely accepts flies(Tweety). There is an argument for flies(Pint) and
therefore the programme definitely accepts flies(Pint). Finally, there is an argument for
flies(Schmuck) (because it is in an airplane), and another for ¬flies(Schmuck) (because it
is a penguin). Neither of these defeats the other, so the programme is defeasibly undecided
about this.
Now suppose we have the following new observations to accommodate:{¬flies(Opus),¬flies(Tweety),flies(Gray),flies(Pint),flies(Schmuck)}.
In this situation, our programme has a partial confirmation wrt Opus, a severe anomaly
wrt Tweety, a surprising observation wrt Gray, a confirmation wrt Pint, and a lacuna wrt
Schmuck.
Then, the situations that a programme may face as a result of its confrontation with new
evidence, clearly indicate which procedure must be employed. If the evidence strongly
confirms P , then the positive heuristic should be applied. This means that either a new
prediction e′ must be obtained and tested, or a new rule R⊆N2 must be found, such that
the theory is expanded, T ′ = T ∪R, verifying that T ′  c for some c ∈ C. If P is partially
confirmed, then the defeated arguments against the observed fact e give a clue about rules
in T or auxiliary hypotheses in C that should be given up.
In the strongly anomalous cases, as we already considered in our abductive reasoning
system, either the programme has to be (partially) given up, or the auxiliary hypotheses
must be accommodated to protect it from this refutation (i.e., the programme enters a
degenerative phase). In the case of a partial anomaly, perhaps the situation can be escaped
with a ranking among the rules in T . It is not clear whether the negative or the positive
heuristic should be used in the cases in which the evidence shows that there exist lacunae
in the programme, or if the ranking among rules in T must be modified. On the other
hand, if a surprising fact is found, it seems that the theory must be expanded to include
new statements, either new rules in T or new auxiliary hypotheses in C, so that at least an
undefeated argument for e can be found.
The account of confirmations, anomalies and undeterminations is useful for the com-
parison among programmes. With this we can refine the empirical success relation among
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programmes. According to Lakatos, the important fact about programmes is the explana-
tory power (a programme that generates good predictions is not abandoned, notwithstand-
ing the anomalies it faces). However, this should have a limit.13 Then, it seems sensible
to consider that a program Pa is strictly more successful than a program Pb iff both every
confirmation for Pb is also a confirmation of Pa , every anomaly of Pb is also an anomaly
of Pa , but there exists at least a confirmation of Pa that is not confirmation of Pb or an
anomaly of Pb that is not anomaly of Pa .
V is the set of observed evidence that our programme confirms (definitely or defeasibly)
F is the set of anomalies, and I is the set of undeterminations (surprises or lacunae).
Definition 17. A programme is P1 empirically more progressive than programme P2 if
V2 ⊂ V1.
P1 is more successful than P2 if V2 ⊆ V1, F1 ⊆ F2, but there exists at least a confir-
mation for P1 that is not confirmation for P2, or a refutation for P2 that is not refutation
for P1.
Example 16 (Example 15 revisited). Consider a new programme Q which is the same as
P but without the defeasible rule in_airplane(X)>– flies(X). We can see that P and Q
are equally progressive (the same facts predicted in both are confirmed), but P is more
successful than Q because there is at least an anomaly in Q that is mere lacuna in P
(namely, Schmuck).
It becomes clear how to render a programme more progressive or more successful in
any of the six possible outcomes (space considerations do not allow us to develop this
thoroughly).
1. In confirmation, there the positive heuristic should be applied, trying to reduce ad hoc
hypotheses (this case is non-problematic, and is outside the scope of this paper).
2. In surprising fact, some ampliative procedure should arise to try to explain the nov-
elty. In this situation the programme must switch to the discovery context, and any
ampliative inference should be performed to build the missing knowledge, typically
performing an abduction.
For instance, given P in Example 15 and the evidence of the surprising fact
flies(Buddy). In this case there can be two most specific and unrelated explanations
(bird(Buddy) or in_airplane(Buddy)), which separately, conjoined or disjointed ex-
plain the observation. During the phase in which any of these two explanations are not
experimentally verified, then they come to engross the protective belt.
3. In severe anomaly, something in the theory should be given up or corrected to try to
accommodate the new evidence.
For instance, given P in Example 15 and the evidence ¬flies(Tweety), then either
we should reject bird(Tweety) or the rule bird(X)>– flies(X) in the particular case of
Tweety (i.e., assume that Tweety is an exception for some reason).
13 If not, inconsistent programmes would always be preferred.
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It is remarkable that if our underlying defeasible reasoning system incorporates defeat
(for instance, specificity defeat), then some cases of severe anomaly as in this example
can be handled as surprising facts, i.e., explained not by giving up something in the
theory, but by mere addition of hypotheses to the protective belt. For instance, with
the hypothesis penguin(Tweety) we may generate an argument for ¬flies(Tweety) that
defeats by specificity the argument of the previous prediction flies(Tweety).
4. In partial confirmation, partial anomaly, and lacuna, a portion of the theory should
be corrected. Therefore it is arguable weather it is an instance of the positive or the
negative heuristic. In fact, we may consider that the most interesting and creative
possibilities arise when a SRP is confronted with this case. This is because partial
confirmations, partial anomalies, and lacunae in the end are the result of conflicting ar-
guments, each of them grounded in the very same evidence. Therefore, a SRP should
modify somehow its core to adequately assimilate the new incoming evidence, i.e., the
programme must evolve to get better adapted.
In the cited example, P has a lacuna in flies(Schmuck). In this situation, the programme
should establish a ranking among the conflicting defeasible rules, giving more strength
to the rules involved in the argument that predicted the result that in fact was the case
(that is, being in a plane is a stronger reason for flying than being a penguin is for not
flying).
8. Conclusion
We presented a treatment of abduction in defeasible reasoning. Our inference system is
based on a natural deduction presentation of the implicational segment of a relevant logic.
We discussed some issues arising from the pragmatic acceptance of abductive inferences in
defeasible theories, in particular, the existence of multiple explanations, the strength of ex-
planations (wrt predictions) the accrual of explanations, and the assessment of explanations
by means of plausibility criteria. We considered in depth the problem of the combination of
defeat among arguments and abductions, showing how a defeasible theory should evolve
when confronted with new, conflicting evidence.
A drawback of defeasible reasoning is the lack of clear semantics. For this reason we
explored the use of partial structures as a semantic foundation for defeasible reasoning.
In partial structures, sentences may not have an exact truth value due to a lack or excess
of information. Instead of remaining silent about their validity, this approach assumes that
these sentences can be evaluated in some structures that may deemed partial, in the sense
that further information can be added to them.
Finally, we explored the remarkable similarities that can be found among the formaliza-
tion of scientific research programmes and our defeasible reasoning system. We regarded
a Lakatos’ Scientific Research Programmes as a special case of defeasible theory, where
the accidental generalizations and other law-like statements are the default rules, and the
conjectures are abductions that “protect” the theory from refutation. We considered the
different states that a programme may assume when confronted with new evidence, and
proposed the corresponding strategies to successfully adapt to conflicting situations, thus
refining original Lakatos’ proposal of positive and negative heuristics.
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